Theorizing Political Difference in Toronto's Postwar Child Care Movement

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Abstract

Theorizing political difference in Toronto's postwar child care movement examines the complicated history of child care service and advocacy in Toronto between 1942-1953. It reviews how and why the State reorganized and closed down child care centres, and in so doing, how public policy and practices stigmatized child care services. The paper seeks to explain how and why different women participated in this process of reorganization, arguing that instead of seeing such women as 'dupes' or 'sell-outs', they were constrained by their institutional positions and affiliations. This story has implications for thinking about the limits and possibilities of contemporary child care organizing.

INTRODUCTION

Among the more useful by-products of World War II for the Canadian working mother was the Dominion-Provincial Day Nurseries Agreement of 1943, a federal-provincial cost-sharing programme that established public day nurseries, child care centres and school feeding programs in Ontario and Québec. In 1946, the federal government terminated its share of child care funding, on the grounds that child care was not a 'peacetime concern.' A Toronto-based coalition of child care advocates lobbied the federal government to continue funding for nursery services. When it became apparent that the federal government would proceed with its plans for closures, advocates turned their attention to the provincial government. From 1946 to 1954, Toronto women struggled--with extremely limited success--to establish a municipal day nursery and child care centre system. An analysis of this postwar child care movement sheds much light on the political possibilities of women's organizing "in and against" the State.

In 1946, advocates organized to save Toronto's 22 child care centres (for school-age children) and 13 day nurseries (for preschool-age children) that had been established under the wartime agreement. Local and provincial governments showed their willingness to support these services, despite the withdrawal of federal funds. However, once child care was taken up as a matter of peacetime policy, it was 'managed' through processes of depoliticization, bureaucratization and therapeutic adjustment. Through this reorganization, child care was politically opposed, bureaucratically redefined and administratively reconstructed--with the active support of certain sectors of child care advocacy. By 1954, the municipal government had closed four nurseries and 20 child care centres, the numbers of days of care fell by over 50 per cent, three fee hikes raised parent fees to over 600 per cent of wartime rates, and eligibility became strictly regulated through invasive casework investigations and means testing. In short, postwar child care services in Toronto were worse for working mothers than they had been during World War II.

Yet women themselves disagreed profoundly about the meaning of these changes to child care services. Many child care advocates supported and participated in the State's reorganization of child care. The child care advocates included child study professionals, social workers, the voluntary sector and militant groups of working mothers, and were far from a homogeneous group, despite their common political project to establish a municipal child care system. The mixed group of child care advocates had differing conceptions about who constituted the client of child care services and why they were provided. Child study experts and social workers were weak supporters of full-day child care. Both within the State and the voluntary sector, these professionals expressed concern about the 'effects' which full-day care might have on children's development, family relations and social stability. As a result of these reservations, experts recommended very special forms of care, alternately educational and developmental or remedial and therapeutic. Both visions
stood in sharp contrast to the demands of the working mothers in the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association. The Communist-led Parents' Association was a staunch defender of an accessible, low-cost, public service for working women and their children. These political differences between advocates contradict notions of unitary 'women's interests' or a singular 'women's standpoint.' In this light, a picture of 'unequal sisters' rather than solidarity, emerges (DuBois & Ruiz, 1990).

One way that differences might be explained is through appeals to the class position of different advocates. It might be assumed that professional social workers and child study experts were engaged in social control, motivated by middle-class and bourgeois ideals, dominating 'other' mothers through maternalistic benevolence, or simply exercising class power. However, this form of race-class-gender analysis--in both its historical and contemporary applications--has the troubling effect of interpreting differences between women as the individualized attributes of the women involved. A crucial problem with this form of analysis is that it shifts analytic focus off social relations and onto individuals. What this theoretical approach produces is a 'mass of individuals' who have been stripped of their anchorage in social relations. This method of theorizing political organization constitutes a form of methodological individualism.

Against this form of analysis, it seems crucial to question what Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty call the "all-too-common conflation of experience, identity and political perspective" (Martin & Mohanty, 1986). In response to their challenge, an alternate method for understanding the differences between and among women in the postwar child care movement is proposed. Instead of appealing to the class/race locations of different women to explain their organizations, political perspectives, or ability to influence public policy, I consider how women's power was produced by, and reflected, their location within the 'extended State.' Following an analytic strategy developed by Dorothy Smith and Gillian Walker, I will argue that the differences between women were largely a function of State formation.

The concept of the 'extended State' is Gramsci's. He argues that the State is:

...the entire social complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent over those whom it rules (Gramsci, 1971, p. 244).

For Gramsci, the extended State is an 'educator', in as much as it shapes and creates new forms of social organization (Gramsci, 1971, p. 247). This notion of the 'extended State' encompasses what Dorothy Smith names as the relations of ruling: that "extraordinary complex of relations and organization mediated by texts that govern, manage, administer, direct, organize, regulate and control contemporary [first world] societies" (Smith, 1988, p. 41). The ensuing analysis employs the insights of Smith, Walker and Gramsci, in lieu of either a methodological individualist analysis of 'middle-class' women or a structural analysis of the 'interests' of 'the State', 'capital' or 'patriarchy'.

Power differences between different women, from this process-oriented perspective, were largely the product of women's institutional locations. While findings that women qua women had more or less equal capacity to 'create' child care as a social problem, they were differentially located in their capacity to 'solve' the problem once it was created. Once child care had been politically accepted as a matter of public responsibility, it was taken up by the social welfare apparatus of the extended State. Child study experts and social workers were part of that extended State, through their roles as licensing officials, Executive Directors of voluntary social services agencies, gatekeepers to professional training, etc. Child study experts and social workers thus had close ties to policymakers and social welfare administrators within the local and provincial government. These institutional relations provided a significant power base from which child study experts and social workers could, with authority and credibility, define the problem of child care and prescribe services to solve the problem. Mothers, qua mothers, had no place within the bureaucratic structure...
of the State and no formal connection to a representative apparatus from which their 'identity' could be 'represented'. 2 The Communist-led working mothers of the Parents' Association had no 'scientific' or professional affiliations, and weak relations with the State. 3 Their only institutional links were with elected militant representatives at the local level--and in the context of Cold War anti-Communism, their informal link to public power eroded. By the early 1950s, the militant Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association was demobilized by red-baiting. By then, the only voices left to advocate for children's services were the voices of professionals and experts who largely supported the State's redefinition of child care and its cutbacks in children's services.

When we view the postwar child care struggle in this way, we discover that there were distinct limits to coalition-based organizing for social policy reforms. These limits particularly mitigated against the effectiveness of the left-wing Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association. Militant child care advocates targeted the State as the object of their lobbying, not their putative allies in the postwar child care coalition. Their organizing was largely confined to a public lobby which established child care as a visible social problem, on the cheerful assumption that "scientific planning," professionals and the civic Department of Public Welfare would meet their needs. The way that the extended State--including women inside and outside the broader public sector--transformed, redefined and ultimately dissipated their concerns reveals how tragically misplaced was their confidence.

TORONTO'S POSTWAR CHILD CARE MOVEMENT

The postwar child care movement can be understood as having been composed of several distinct 'moments.' The first such moment was the immediate postwar crisis of 1946, when advocates struggled to ensure that child care services had a place in reconstruction planning. From 1947 to about 1950, a second phase occurred. Over these years, child care was taken up by the State and processed through dynamics of depoliticization and bureaucratization. These processes of State formation had consequences for child care advocacy. Through these new policies, social workers and child study professionals began to enjoy greater power to define and solve the problem of child care, while left-wing advocates--increasingly marginalized--were left in relative isolation to oppose the new policies of centralized admissions, higher fees, and increasingly rationality. Advocates were thus divided over and by the State's redefinition of child care. A third phase occurred as notions of 'mental hygiene' and psychiatric casework reorganized the field of child care services after 1950. The fourth and final stage was complete by 1954, when child care services had been decimated and militant child care advocacy had been derailed by "a rising anti-red tide" and State formation (Lemon, 1985).

The Postwar Crisis: 1946

The federal government's decision to end the Dominion-Provincial Day Nurseries Agreement generated a large cross-class movement of advocates who opposed Ottawa's plans. The federal government, however, was unmoved by community organizing, and federal funding stopped in June 1946. 4 Federal reconstruction plans, despite the new climate of social security and human welfare, did not include underwriting the costs of what was seen to be mothers' work. 5 As federal Deputy Minister of Labour, Robert MacNamara explained to Ontario officials, "the financing of these and similar plans by the Dominion Government has been done as a war measure, and our Treasury Board naturally takes that position, 'now that the war is over, why do you need the money?'" (Pierson, 1977, p. 142).
Child care advocates nevertheless stood on strong ground when they argued that there was a widespread demand for ongoing nursery services. One factor was that women were continuing to work, despite predictions that they would leave the labour force after the war. A September 1945 survey discovered that 484 of the 542 working mothers in Toronto (a full 90 per cent) intended to keep their jobs "indefinitely" (Shultz, 1977). These figures were typical of working women's widespread desire to continue paid work even in peacetime. In early February 1946, all three daily newspapers carried reports of a city survey which had found that 1,000 children used child care programs, while 1,000 more were on waiting lists (The Toronto Star, February 6, 1946; The Telegram, February 6, 1946; The Globe and Mail, February 6, 1946). The Toronto Welfare Council provided more ammunition for child care advocates, when its President, Mrs. Spaulding released a survey predicting 3,000 children "would suffer" if the nurseries were closed (The Toronto Star, May 23, 1946). Moreover, regular and sympathetic press coverage of the imminent child care crisis contributed to public support for child care services.

Faced with these facts, and confronted with citizen organizing, the provincial and municipal governments took immediate action. In less than two weeks, the Ontario government (with a Conservative majority) passed the 1946 Day Nurseries Act that included a new municipal/provincial cost-sharing agreement. Despite the new legislation, the province was a grudging supporter of child care. As The Globe and Mail reported,

> While the Provincial Government has expressed concern that any deserving cases should suffer for the cessation of the plan, welfare officials are agreed that whenever possible mothers shouldn't shirk their responsibility in caring for their children at home in order to boost what is already an equitable income by working daily. "We believe that a child should be brought up in the proper environment in its own home, when possible" said one official (The Globe and Mail, July 11, 1946).

Like the Province, the City of Toronto also committed itself to supporting child care. The civic government agreed to fully support all 13 day nurseries, to temporarily maintain six of the 22 wartime child care centres, and to establish a Special Advisory Committee to investigate and recommend on the long-term fate of child care.

Child care advocates took credit for the provincial 1946 Day Nurseries Act (DNA) and for the civic commitment to children's service. Although the DNA only covered day nursery services for preschoolers—entirely ignoring the sizable numbers of school-aged children who needed child care—advocates welcomed the new legislation. As Isabel Bevis, President of the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association told the press, the reopening of the centres was "the result mainly of the children's parents and the concerned citizens in the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association" (The Toronto Star, July 31, 1946). The Toronto Star lauded this move as part of "good government" (The Toronto Star, July 31, 1946).

This remarkable civic concession was the product of Toronto's distinctive political history. Toronto had a well-developed voluntary social service sector and a longstanding tradition of municipal philanthropy. Toronto's social welfare/social service network bridged the supposed divide of 'public' and 'private' as the career paths of many social reformers spanned the extended State, including elected office, quasi-public positions (like the Toronto Reconstruction Council) and membership in the large voluntary sector. The career path of May Birchard clearly demonstrates this openness: at different points, Birchard was a school trustee, a ward alderman, an appointee to various government advisory committees, an executive member of leading women's organizations, and a prolific media hound and inveterate letter-writer. Each of these institutional locations varied: her affiliation as a school trustee and alderman was as a member of the government proper; as an appointee, she was situated within the State more broadly; as a women's activist, she belonged to social movements theorized in the sphere of civil society; her letters to the editor were written as a
'private' citizen. In this melange of 'public' and 'private' personae, Birchard was not merely a fractured or multiple subject as postmodernism posits: instead a coherence emerges when we analyze her work through the prism of the extended State (Prentice, 1993).

In addition, ever since the Popular Front period in the 1930s, local politics were shaped by a significant degree of Communist and left-wing organizing. Women played key leadership roles in Communist politics at the very local level—in, for example, ward organizations, settlement houses and neighbourhood organizations. As a result of effective Communist organizing, left-wing politicians were regularly elected to City Council and to the Board of Education. Within the State, these militant politicians lent their support to comrades in extra-State organizations.

By 1946, advocates had established child care as a social problem. The most powerful extra-State child care actors were early childhood educationalists, located in the Institute for Child Study (ICS) at the University of Toronto. The influence of the ICS on the child care field was enormous. Donna Varga argues that, between 1925 and 1960, the ICS was "the central authority structuring ideas about children and their care in Canada" (Varga, 1991). The ICS had been called upon by the provincial government during the war to train child care workers and volunteers for placement in public programs (Pierson, 1977; Strong-Boag, 1982; Raymond, 1991). After the war, when the province agreed to continue services, it called on the well-known ICS Director Dr. William Blatz and his staff to draft the new provincial legislation. In their recollection of how the legislation was developed, two former staff members recalled that "We did fairly well on the space and equipment, but when it came to program, Dr. Blatz, who was very tired, said 'just tell them to do what we do at the Institute'" (Wright, c1946). As a result, from 1946, in every version through 1968, The Day Nurseries Act read, "play materials and equipment, indoor and outdoor [shall be] of a type conforming to the standards currently accepted at the Institute of Child Study at the University of Toronto," and "each procedure on the [daily] timetable shall conform to the standards currently accepted at the Institute of Child Study at the University of Toronto." The ICS, thus, had an enormous influence on, and extensive involvement in, the extended State.

Although the child study professionals had drafted the first piece of child care legislation in North America, the professionals at the Institute of Child Study agreed that the optimum child care service was a half-day developmental nursery school. As ICS graduates Dorothy Millichamp and Mary Northway remember:

After the war we hoped there would be more day nurseries, but only what was necessary. Professionally, we didn't want to see day care bloom. We didn't want to see parents put their children out. We never felt it was the right answer unless it was absolutely necessary (Millichamp & Northway, 1977).

The ultimate goal of child study experts was to ensure that all children enjoyed a quality part-day nursery school experience for maximum personal growth and development. Thus, in Canada, as in Britain, the sudden expansion of public child care during the war had proved a source of "uncomfortably mingled anxiety and optimism" (Riley, 1979, p. 90) to child study experts. Experts walked a tightrope, claiming on the one hand that quality nurseries were a crucial part of child enrichment, yet simultaneously combating the public perception (which many child study experts shared) that full-day child care should be opposed. Their eventual position rested on the place of child care in a larger program of welfare provision. As Dorothy Millichamp, senior administrator of the provincial child care program reasoned,

While day nurseries are essentially an emergency program to supplement employment, it is increasingly evident that in practice they should function as part of the community health, welfare and educational program (Survey of Dominion-Provincial Wartime Day Nurseries, 1944, p. 2).
The second stage of the child care struggle in Toronto began in late 1946. The way in which child care advocates had created the problem of child care permitted--even mandated--the social welfare apparatus of the State and the voluntary sector to solve the problem. Once child care was repositioned in the social service agenda, the State was both given (by advocates) and assumed (through its social welfare apparatus) increasing power to define the problem of child care and to prescribe for its solution. The way that the State 'managed' child care was through processes of depoliticalization and bureaucratization. After 1946, when civic and provincial politicians had declared their willingness to maintain and fund services, explicitly political debate largely ended: from that point onward, the contest was over what was understood--by politicians, welfare officials and most advocates, even militants--to be technical matters of administration.

After the immediate crisis, child care was transferred out of the domain of political debate and into the domain of service delivery--a conventional separation of policy development from its implementation. Even through day nurseries and child care centres were new civic services, they were quickly absorbed into preexisting bureaucratic channels. Despite a formal political commitment to continue child care services, bureaucratic control of administration had significant power to restrict services. Because only experts and professionals had the proper authority to determine need and eligibility, mothers and militant advocates played no role in the administration of child care within the State, although social workers and early childhood educationalists grew increasingly involved. It became axiomatic that service users were not credible interveners into policy development or service management--especially since working mothers were considered part of the 'problem' of child care. The 1946 Special Advisory Committee on Day Care, for example, which was assigned the task of determining the future of services for school-age children, was composed of politicians and various administrators; while working mothers could make presentations to the Committee, they were neither members of it nor were they represented by it.

In late 1947, the Special Advisory Committee made its report. The Committee suggested reopening only 12 of the 18 child care centres which had closed in 1946, and recommended doubling fees "to eliminate from care those children of mothers who work from choice rather than from economic necessity" (Toronto Committee on Public Welfare, 1947). The Committee further recommended that eligibility and admissions should be determined through "screening" conducted by trained social workers. In February 1948 the Board of Control tabled the Advisory Committee's reported on child care centres, arguing that the City should not pay for services which the Province did not cost-share. Child care advocates were bitterly disappointed that the City would not re-open a single closed child care centre. "How many times do we have to go through this? This is where I came in," May Birchard cried.

Restrictive fee and eligibility policies were justified by the Commissioner of Public Welfare on a basis of fraud. In February 1948, the Department of Public Welfare had investigated families
enrolled in public programs, and had determined 11 cases were ineligible. While 11 cases were hardly evidence of widespread abuse, the findings were used to heighten a popular sense that child care users were cheats. As Commissioner Rupert explained, many families tried to deceive his department:

I was told by a supervisor there was a certain gentleman who drove up in his car, left his child, and then called in his car that night for the child again," he stated. "The child was placed in the centre on the assumption the mother had to work. Then it was discovered the mother was helping out in the father's fruit store. I really felt that was miscarriage of justice and there are other similar cases...I thought it was very unfair for a couple with a good business and a beautiful car to be asking for day care help (Protests asking mothers prove need for care, c.1948).

When Ward 6 Alderman William Clifton heard the Commissioner's story, he cried out "I wouldn't spend a plugged nickel on a couple like Mr. Rupert has named. Those people are chiselers!" (Protests asking mothers prove need for care, c.1948). Mayor Saunders probably spoke for many City fathers when he argued that:

There is no reason that I can see why the City should subsidize nursery care for parents who want to get their children off their hands. Some people choose to let the City bear responsibilities that are rightfully their own as parents (The Toronto Star, April 20, 1948).

By late 1948, it was difficult to think collectively about families with legitimate demands for care; instead the paradigm had shifted to individually-determined 'deserving' cases. Public perception was dominated by concern about 'chiselers' and the 'undeserving' family--a marked change from the wartime acceptance of the legitimate need of working women.

Inside Toronto, child care was positioned as a social welfare problem under the control of civil servants. As a result, conventional limited criteria began to be exercised. Local social welfare administration was premised on individualistic notions of 'less eligibility' and 'deserving cases', despite the thrust of universal programs at the national level. The first consequence of civic practices of 'less eligibility' was the reorganization of admissions. Whereas during the war a mother's employment, if deemed 'essential war industry', was sufficient criterion for the admission of her child into public care, after the war the presumption of entitlement was reversed. City welfare workers assumed that, under normal conditions, a mother could make the alternative choice not to work--thus solving her apparent need for child care services. Mothers who worked, therefore, provided de facto material and cause for investigation. This meant that the structural conditions which necessitated mothers' employment were personalized, reframed as an optional matter of family choice. As an optional matter, the only compelling reason for a mother's paid employment was if her family was in some way deficient; hence, the 'common-sense' basis for new admissions criteria. The inevitable consequence of these policies was to distinguish the needy, abnormal single-parent or otherwise deviant family which was eligible for care, from the normal, undeserving, respectable two-parent family which was ineligible for care.

Civic eligibility policy revolved around assumptions of maternal responsibility. As the City's director of Welfare Services, Miss Morris (a trained social worker) explained, "from a social standpoint, preschool children should preferably be cared for in their own homes by their mothers, rather than have all-day care elsewhere." Since the mother was "the mainstay of the home," Morris argued, the mothers' "social reasons for going to work must be carefully gone into and accurately recorded." Morris argued that few reasons would be acceptable to the Department. It would require investigations by a trained social worker to determine, for example, "if the mother's health would be impaired by assuming the additional responsibilities of employment as well as her home duties," the effect of the mother's employment on other members of the family, the nature of the work for which the mother is qualified, and "any other information which will assist the Department in
arriving at a wise decision as to whether the mother's plan can be justified from a Civic standpoint" (Morris, 1950). The rise of scientific management across both the State and the voluntary sector reflected a major dislocation of sentiment in favour of systematic intervention (Rooke & Schnell, 1983).

The importance of social workers and other professionals increased under new public policies. The new admissions, eligibility and fee schedule all required experts' assessments, replacing working mothers' authority to decide their needs. The growing importance of professionals and bureaucrats generated a parallel diminishment of the influence of working mothers and militant advocates. The problem of child care was repositioned and redefined through these processes of State formation: not as a social problem in need of a political solution, but as a limited concern for a limited target group. As Isabel Bevis, President of the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association lamented,

> The results after over two years, has been the stopping of parent study groups in the day nurseries, double and triple fee increases in the day nursery fees, and refusing to place children on the waiting lists of the day nurseries, very little improvement in the standards of day care, no expansion of facilities, and finally the one concrete project passed and ordered at the beginning of this year, the alterations to the Jessie Ketchum Day Nursery to provide a demonstration centre, has not even been started (The Toronto Star, November 3, 1948)

**Therapy Enters the Nursery: 1950-51**

The way the State formation redefined child care was bad enough in the immediate postwar years, yet it worsened under the influence of casework and mental hygiene at the turn of the decade. As social workers sought to professionalize child care services, they carried casework assumptions into the nursery. Mothers' employment had already been repositioned as a 'choice' through social welfare administration. Under the impact of casework, maternal employment was further transformed into evidence of deep-seated family pathology. The therapeutic premises of casework aggressively personalized child care need and use. Caseworkers saw child care services as an opportunity for therapeutic interventions: under the cloak of protective benevolence, caseworkers sought to restore parental respectability through restoring maternal responsibility.

Social workers and the casework practice of mental hygiene, were given a big boost by the 1950 Survey of Family and Children's Services, sponsored by the Toronto Welfare Council (TWC). The TWC had hired a nine-person American research team of social workers to make recommendations for the 'effective' and 'economic' development of voluntary sector welfare services. With respect to child care, the Survey defined day nurseries as "a mental hygiene which prevents personality damage to children resulting from inadequate care and guidance during the early years (Toronto Survey of Family and Children's Services, 1950, p. 37). The Survey staff explained that "casework" was therefore an "integral part of the nursery services. It should be available to parents at all times, from the point of application to the point of the child's leaving the nursery" (Toronto Survey of Family and Children's Services, 1950, p. 38). Despite the mental health benefits of child care, Survey staffs were disturbed at the amount of child care services available in Toronto. "As compared to other cities, this is a high ratio of daycare service to child population," they identified disapprovingly (Toronto Survey of Children's Services, 1950, p. 37). Survey staffs were convinced that "the emphasis on care for children of working mothers has the effect of creating a large demand for such care where this may not be the most appropriate solution to the family problem (Toronto Survey of Family and Children's Services, 1950, p. 38).

As caseworkers kept emphasizing, part of what it meant to encourage parental responsibility was to restore financial responsibility by positioning parents as paying customers. As the 1950 Survey of
Family and Children's Services concluded, "financial participation is conducive to responsible citizenship." Thus "encouraging the assuming of as much financial cost of care as possible enhances the self respect of parents," conversely "the practice of waiving the fee or arbitrarily setting it low can discourage parental responsibility." The casework emphasis on possessive individualism as a sign of mental health and family strength misrepresented the reasons why child care use would be necessary in a working class family, and, as importantly, misrecognized the source of opposition to high fees and restrictive policies. In the casework framework, political protest itself was misconstrued as evidence of the need for mental hygiene readjustment.

Voluntary private sector agencies affiliated with the Toronto Welfare Council were enthusiastic supporters of 'modern' social service practices and so moved speedily to implement the Survey's recommendations as they sought to offer the most 'modern' services possible. One problem private agencies confronted was dramatically increased costs as they began to implement casework services, costs which the province refused to cost-share. The President of the West End Creche expressly blamed the "educationalist" child study emphasis of the Day Nurseries Act:

I greatly regret that the provincial Day Nurseries Act does not expressly provide for the financial support of a casework services in a Day Nursery, for to me this should be an integral part of every Day Nursery and should receive the support of public funds (West End Creche, 1953).

Nevertheless, even without public funds, private agencies hired trained social workers and reorganized their day nursery programs. In this reorganization, notions of mental hygiene played a starring role. According to Victoria Day Nursery (VDN) Executive Director Miss Gilfillian (who held a Master's Degree in Psychiatric Social Work from Boston University) "the main function of a day nursery" was "the promotion of mental health for the group being served" (Victoria Day Nursery, 1953). After all, as the VDN President explained,

It is well-known now that many persons who grew up with serious personality disorders or who even develop neuroses or psychosis could have been helped in their early years (Victoria Day Nursery, 1949, p. 2).

The paradigm of mental health and casework had unintended depoliticizing effects on children's advocates. As the Toronto Welfare Council and the voluntary sector were drawn into the Survey's paradigm of professionalism, casework and mental hygiene, the cross-class coalition of reformers which had united back in 1946 slowly came unraveled. Moderate and philanthropic reformers identified with, and allied themselves with modern social work, finding affinity with the individualizing and therapeutic practice of casework. Militant advocates, in contrast, found little appeal in the depoliticized discourse and practice of casework. Yet their opposition was reframed as 'resistance', and their claims to represent mothers were understood by State officials and the public to carry less credibility than the 'neutral' and 'impartial' judgments of social workers and other experts.

'Casework' did more than just divide Toronto's community of social welfare reformers. More importantly, the paradigm of casework condensed a set of political meanings which went far beyond a simple notion of 'mental health'. The casework model drew on, and incited, anxiety about the "democratic family," communism and the stability of the nation (Michels, 1987). Psychiatric social work cemented these links as it conjoined democracy, mental health, and normal domestic relations. Thus it became common sense for West End Creche to report that "a happy secure childhood is the foundation upon which a stable responsible adulthood is built." The Creche explained,

An adult's mental health depends very much on the emotional pattern established during childhood, and therefore our part in the building of 'sturdy personalities' is in
itself a very real contribution to community mental health (West End Creche, 1950).

Like West End Creche, Victoria Day Nursery was also convinced that child care was "the first line of defense in preventing future misfits in society" (Smith, 1958). Victoria Day Nursery emphasized that "part-time [nursery] care is more conducive to mental health than full-time care" (Smith, 1958). The Day Nursery Committee Welfare Council took the stand "that the child's best home is in his own home" and affirmed that nursery care was "a form of placement, the goal of which is to strengthen the family unit" (Day Nursery Committee of the Toronto Welfare Council, 1953). This confidence was backed up by the Canadian Mental Health Association, who put it most simply: "the fundamental mental health unit is the home" (Canadian Mental Health Association, 1953).

The political consequences of experts' concern about mental health were real and practical: support for child care funding evaporated. In the summer of 1950, Provincial Minister of Public Welfare William Goodfellow, told the press that:

Day care centres are most unfair things... This thing could extend until we would have the State taking over the children. The foundations of society are weak enough without straining them further (The Toronto Star, July 21, 1950).

Only a few months later, Mr Goodfellow argued passionately against public provision:

It seems inadequate that, simply because the parents in the family wished to work for some purpose, public funds should provide a means of caring for their children if there is no real economic or social need for them both working (Goodfellow, 1951).

The Minister lamented "the emphasis on the care for children of working mothers" since it had "the effect of creating a large demand for such care where this may not be the most appropriate solution to the family problem." The Minister approvingly cited one of the findings of the TWC Survey of Family and Children's Services, namely that "the practice of waiving the fee or arbitrarily setting it at a low figure can discourage parental responsibility." Given that supply might drive demand, Goodfellow recommended "there should be rigid screening of admissions" conducted by "trained social workers."

The City, like the Province, also retreated from its earlier limited support for child care services. In reflecting on City Council's proposed cutbacks to nursery services, The Toronto Star editorialized,

It is well known certain of the Board of Control's members along with others on the City's Welfare Council, fear children's centres are the "camel's head" for what Ald. Belyea calls "statism." Since it is deemed politically unwise to attack progress with such a wide logical and sentimental appeal, they fall back on the claim that care of the City's children is not the City's business (The Toronto Star, June 8, 1950).

In light of dwindling political support, the Department of Public Welfare designed new policies to minimize the costs of child care and to maximize cost recovery.

**Erosion: 1951-1954**

Over the three years preceding Metropolitan amalgamation, the State's redefinition of child care accelerated in Toronto. Professional social workers and the voluntary sector were active participants in this process. Private child care agencies were drawn into an orbit of rationality and efficiency in the name of 'effective' modern welfare services, a paradigm which they shared with
welfare administrators within the State. As City policies reconstructed fees, admissions and eligibility in the guise of 'rational' and 'cost-effective' service, child care providers in the extended State also made parallel changes to reorganize their programs along the lines of rational and efficient administration. The shared paradigm of calculability and efficiency created an alignment of voluntary agencies, social work professionals and the State's welfare apparatus which marginalized the militant mothers in the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association.

These effects engendered by rationalization created a real tension between groups interested in and benefiting from calculability and efficiency on the one hand, and groups with a different social and economic agenda on the other. 'Effective and economic' were a seemingly value-neutral administrative technique, which--although 'rationalizing' policy--actually misrepresented child care need and misinterpreted child care users. Despite these practical effects, the paradigm of calculability and efficiency conjoined voluntary agencies, social work professionals and the State's welfare apparatus. This was a practical affinity, organized by the institutional arrangements of the extended State.

Between 1951 and 1952, the City's Commissioner of Public Welfare developed a package of new policies which substantially reorganized child care services in Toronto. The Department successfully proposed a significant transformation of child care policy, including the permanent adoption of a Central Registry, four-point priority scale for admissions based on family form and massive fee increases. Welfare Commissioner Rupert arranged that the administration policies and financial arrangements were also applied in private nursery centres, a stipulation which drew private agencies more tightly into the broader public sector.

In 1950, the City began to set up a Central Registry to coordinate all admissions. After 1950, centre-based discretion was eliminated as 'universal' cross-City standards were uniformly applied to all mothers. The Registry also had political consequences. Whereas formerly all families who requested care were entered into waiting lists, after 1950, only the names of 'approved' families found their way onto waiting lists. The political effect of the Registry was to eliminate 'desiring' from 'deserving' families. We can see how this operated in practice: between May 1950 and January 1951, the Department of Public Welfare received 986 applications for care. Of this total, bureaucrats admitted 489, placed 179 children on the waiting lists, and rejected 311 children as "nursery or day care centre was not considered socially advisable or justifiable at public expense" (Committee on Public Welfare, 1951, p. 619). In this example, the waiting lists fell from 490 to 179 names--a 'reduction' in need/demand by over 65 percent through the stroke of a pen. Since waiting lists had long been used by militant advocates as proof of widespread need, the decimation of the waiting lists undermined a key plank in their campaign.

Militant advocates bitterly opposed the Central Registry, but had little impact on Welfare Commissioner Rupert and were unable to change the administration policy. Parents' Association President Isabel Bevis repeatedly reminded Commissioner Rupert and the civic committee on welfare that the "mothers paid well for the services and the screenings were ridiculous" (The Toronto Star, April 19, 1950). She warned that "investigations, screenings and petty regulations" were being used by the City "in a futile attempt to reduce the numbers of families using day care nurseries and day care centres" (The Toronto Star, June 8, 1950).

In 1951, the City implemented a new and higher fee schedule. After September 1951, parent fees were set according to a "sliding scale" which was determined through a complex formula and means test. For the first time ever, fees were set on a cost-recovery basis--a 180 degree shift from the principle of public subsidy. Ultimately, as the Communist Tribune noted, full recovery of costs from parent fees would reduce the municipal and provincial contributions to nil (Stone, 1951). In an equally radical departure, the City introduced means testing to determine eligibility and fees. While the Toronto Welfare Council and moderate reformers protested certain details of the fee schedule, the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association were sharp critics of the whole
philosophy of cost-recovery. According to the Association, the new fee schedule was a "fantastic nightmare" (Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association, 1951a). They bluntly argued that "the new fees are too high and the so-called formula is nonsense" (Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association, 1951b). The Association was convinced--correctly as it turned out--that the real objective of City policy was to close centres. Without success, the Association demanded that the City "withdraw all increases, dispense with the screening depot, discard the means test and investigators, and re-establish the waiting list method of admission under the direction of the supervisors" (Bevis, 1951). Instead, children from families which met the admissions criteria and were approved by City casework investigation were admitted into care, while their parents paid vastly higher fees.

The new "sliding fee scale" of 1951 varied according to the number of adults and the number of children in a given family. An arbitrarily determined minimum fee set the floor, while the full per diem operating cost established the top fee for children in public programs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum and Maximum Child Care Fees</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day Nursery†</td>
<td>$0.15/$0.50</td>
<td>$0.50/$1.00</td>
<td>$0.25/$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care Centre‡</td>
<td>$0.10/$0.25</td>
<td>$0.15/$0.35</td>
<td>$0.10/$0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Day Nursery: is a full or part day program for preschool children aged 2-5 years. Regulated and funded by the Day Nurseries Act after 1946.
‡ Child Care Centre: distinct from a day nursery, a child care centre is a service for school-aged children, offering preschool, lunch-time and after-school care. Not regulated or funded by the Day Nurseries Act.

Most parents were asked to pay vastly increased fees, with increases frequently reaching 300 percent or more (Committee on Public Welfare, 1951). Although Welfare Commissioner Rupert repeatedly gave assurances that no one with "real need" would be eliminated from care due to new fees, six out of ten parents who were asked to pay $2.00 or more, and one in four assessed at $1.50 - $2.00 withdrew their children, although the new scale was ostensibly designed to assist low income families (Rupert, 1951). Over 80 percent of withdrawals were from families (single and two-parent) who were asked to pay over $2.00/day. Of 541 family units using nurseries in 1951, 191 families (43 percent) withdrew, with two parent families withdrawing at three times the rate of single parent families. Two-parent families were ten times more likely to cite higher fees as the reason for withdrawal, and when faced with fee hikes, mothers in two-parent families were eight times more likely to discontinue employment than women who were sole supporters. The fee policy thus effectively discouraged two-parent families from public service, while halving the remaining number of enrollees.

Low-income families were asked to pay impossibly high fees. One example is the case of Mrs Jones, whose two sons were enrolled at Kimberly Nursery School. Because of the new fee schedule, the family was asked to pay $3.20/day, a 400 percent increase over their previous rate of $0.80/day. Mrs. Jones wrote Commissioner Rupert to explain that "this new fee is absolutely impossible to pay, and yet my boys absolutely need this day care. We are living in two rooms in a six roomed house," the mother explained,
There is a total of fifteen people here and we all share the same bathroom. There is no place for my children to play except in the street if I am forced to withdraw. I am not only worried about their physical health, but about their mental health (Letter to Commissioner Rupert, August 27, 1951a).

Commissioner Rupert responded to Mrs Jones' letter:

I have examined with Miss Stevens, Supervisor of Nursery and Day Care Centres who interviewed you, the Statement showing your monthly income and expenses. It is apparent that you are in a better position to pay $3.20/day (Letter from Commissioner Rupert, August 27, 1951a).

As a result, working poor parents like Mrs. Jones were forced to withdraw their applications or unregister their children. This case, like others, reveals how strictly the Department of Public Welfare enforced eligibility criteria.

Overall, the State's manner of regulating child care was marked by a refinement of techniques of calculation, the enhanced authority of specialized knowledge and the extension of technically rational control over programming and administration. All these led inexorably to a depersonalization of relationships. This 'formal rationality' was especially significant for the way it increased the administrative and practical power of bureaucrats, displacing both service providers and mothers. An inevitable by-product of rationalization and bureaucratization was a decrease in the practical power of non-experts and non-administrators. As Robert Brubaker argues, "the more important the role played by technical expertise in the functioning of a bureaucratic organization, the less responsive the organization will be to the control of those who lack such expertise: bureaucracy, in short, invites technology (Brubaker, 1984, p. 22).

By the early 1950s, the City's policies had winnowed child care into a targeted program for only the neediest. 'Need' was proven through means-testing, casework and investigations in a climate of restricted eligibility that ran counter to the new national emphasis on universal programs. By the early 1950s, civic politicians and welfare administrators were only willing to subsidize the cost of child care for the poor, single-parent families. This was a dramatic transition from a wartime acceptance of the principle of publicly-subsidized child care.

Public policies had immediate effects on private agencies. At the Annual General Meeting of the Board of Directors of the West End Creche in 1951, the Director discussed the "rapidly-accelerated falling-off of applications in the last few months of the year" (West End Creche, 1951, p. 3). Enrollments continued to decline, and in 1951, the outgoing President of the Creche identified the drop as "the most striking change" during her term of office. Sophie Boyd, Director, spelled it out in more detail. Boyd pointed it out that low applications produced a "logical chain of results: reduced registration, lowered attendance and the inevitable increase in our per capita per diem rate." It was clear to the West End Creche, with the benefit of one full year of increased City fees behind them, that "the municipal policy resulted in the withdrawal of several children, and prevented the admission of others who would have benefited from continued nursery care" (West End Creche, 1952, p. 8).

By the early 1950s, the scale and scope of State intervention had expanded many times since the end of the war. After 1951, any mother seeking to use a public day nursery or child care centre confronted a dazzling array of obstacles. She first had to 'prove' that her request for child care was justified. This required at least one, and usually several, casework investigations undertaken by a social worker. The municipal social worker could only be reached through the Central Registry. And, as the Parents' Association tartly reminded,
Since last May all applications for this service had to be made at Bay and Albert Streets, to an office that closes at 4:30 p.m. Toronto is a big city--10 miles across and 10 miles north and south. The parents who apply are working (The Toronto Star, Letter to the Editor, February 16, 1951).

Once assessed and interviewed, the social worker's judgement was final. All authority for admissions and eligibility lay with civil servants.

In order for a family to become eligible for public care, their personal and financial arrangements had to come under the scrutiny of municipal authorities three times: once during the initial assessment of need, again as fees were determined, then every six months to ensure their situation remained unchanged. The internal quality of a child care-using family's domestic arrangements was also scrutinized. Under the means test, municipal authorities had the power to decide if a family's spending met approved patterns. One mother furiously protested these investigations saying: "no parent with a modicum of human dignity can accept the probing into how they spend each cent of their income or even less, can they accept being told how to spend their lawfully-earned money" (Letter to Commissioner Rupert, June 18, 1951b) -- but her protests were ignored.

By 1954, the combined effect of fees and eligibility policies had taken a dramatic toll on child care services. In early 1951, 12 day nurseries and three child care centres were directly operated by the City of Toronto (Toronto Committee on Public Welfare, 1951). By 1953, the City was only operating nine day nurseries and two child care centres. Days of care had dropped from a 1947 high of 248,828 to only 129,571 in 1954, a drop of over 50 percent. These accelerating cutbacks were publicly attributed by the State to low rates of enrolment. The Commissioner of Public Welfare said publicly in 1951 that falling attendance "proves that the actual need of the day nursery services was not as great at they [the Association] represented" (Toronto Committee on Public Welfare, 1951, p. 1551).

### Number of Days of Publicly-Provided Child Care 1946-1954*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Day Nurseries</th>
<th>Public Day Care Centres</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946*</td>
<td>53,345</td>
<td>46,460</td>
<td>110,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>111,625</td>
<td>137,203</td>
<td>248,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1,398,293</td>
<td>133,444</td>
<td>242,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>111,058</td>
<td>126,427</td>
<td>237,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>103,389</td>
<td>112,041</td>
<td>215,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>85,847</td>
<td>81,335</td>
<td>166,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>80,517</td>
<td>61,829</td>
<td>142,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>78,058</td>
<td>58,876</td>
<td>136,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>70,695</td>
<td>58,876</td>
<td>129,571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1946 only covers a half-year period (July 1-December 31) after the City assumed responsibility for child care upon the termination of the Dominion-Provincial Day Nursery Agreement.

The Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association was weakened by these processes of State formation. Several factors contributed to the increasing marginalization of militant advocates in public and political discourse. First, a rising anti-Communist hysteria reinterpreted everything to the left of the C.C.F. as treasonous disloyalty. This Cold War climate displaced most demands for social provision from the universe of political discourse. Secondly, because left-wing community
activists relied on support from elected comrades, anti-Communist campaigns and the electoral defeats of militant candidates handicapped the work of left-wing groups. Undoubtedly, a related factor was the 1949 Communist Party decision to turn away from the remnants of Popular Front organizing in favour of 'peaceful coexistence' and peace movement organizing.¹⁰

Perhaps the deadliest blow to the Parents' Association was the bitter scourging it received at a widely-discussed public meeting on May 30, 1951. At that meeting of the civic welfare committee, the Parents' Association led a large deputation to oppose the new civic fee and admission policies. Their claims to represent mothers evaporated when an unaffiliated mother, Mrs. Chris Monk, spoke in fervent favour of the City's proposals. A clash was inevitable, and a barrage of press reports delighted in the "pandemonium" which ensued (Telegram, May 30, 1951). Among many equally colourful charges, Mrs. Monk was reported to have scornfully told the civic committee that "it doesn't need an expert with an acute sense of colour to realize what it is back of this organized protest. This is nothing but a Communist-inspired revolt." The meeting then broke into an "uproar," with "women in the delegation screening threats at her. 'Wait until we get you outside; We'll tear your hair out'; one woman shouted" (The Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail; Telegram, May 30, 1951).

News of the 'Monk Meeting' spread far and did a great deal of damage to left-wing women's organizing efforts. The Financial Post raised the specter of how vicious and unfeminine Communist women were. In an article entitled "The Red's Pink Tea Circuit: This Communist Front Fools a Lot of Women," writer Ronald Williams explained, "non-Communist delegations don't usually conduct themselves the way the group did that appeared before the Toronto Civic Welfare Committee. That group was belligerent, abusive in a well-organized way" (Financial Post, June 9, 1951). Williams linked the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association to the Korean War, the Kremlin, and international communism mainly by identifying the husbands of active women as Communists. He concluded that:

...without the party liners and sympathizers there are enough outright party members of this organization to ensure that it stays on the rails to Moscow. All the evidence indicates that this organization's lines lead right to the Kremlin (Financial Post, June 9, 1951).

It would have seemed virtually impossible for any new mother to become involved in child care advocacy, when child care advocates were so thoroughly demonized. Militant advocates faced the summer badly demoralized by the Monk Meeting, having lost credibility at City Council, and in sober recognition of the devastating consequences of new city fee and admission policy. While half-hearted letters and press releases appeared under their name in the fall, the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association effectively ended after the Monk Meeting.

Mother-led child care advocacy ended when the Parents' Association disbanded in late 1951. This left only professionals and experts within the extended State to speak on behalf of the clients in their care. The fate of advocacy after the demise of the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association reveals the degree to which the child care movement had been a movement of professionals and social reformers for children, rather than a movement for or of women with child care needs. Child care was premised--by all organizations except the defunct Parents' Association--on conservative notions of maternal responsibility, minimal public involvement, and professional control.

Through the dynamics of professionalization, bureaucratization and therapeutic individuation, the problem of child care became redefined. Unlike the left-wing Parents' Association which had held the problem to be the absence of service, the problem of child care became transposed across the extended State as the provision of service. In the absence of left-wing opposition, the obvious solution to this kind of problem was to reduce service and hence 'solve' the problem. This is precisely what happened over the early 1950s, as Commissioner Rupert's Department of Public
Welfare steadily reduced the number of days of care provided and progressively closed day nurseries and child care centres.

On March 16, 1954, Commissioner Rupert wrote James Band, Deputy Minister of Public Welfare to celebrate the cutbacks which flowed from his policy changes: "I am of the opinion that the prime political reasons for the decline in the number of children requiring care in recent years has been due to our admission and fee policies." He noted with satisfaction that "in recognition of the decline in demand of care of children, there has been, as you know, a progressive closing of nurseries. We shall continue to watch the situation closely and will not hesitate to recommend the closing of additional nursery units if deemed necessary" (Band, J. 1954, March 16). The Communist Daily Tribune noted bitterly that "the dwindling and inadequate [child care] program is the result of the double indifference of both provincial and civic government" (Canadian Tribune, November 12, 1951).

CONCLUSION

This paper investigated how different women's organizations 'created' the problem of child care, and how that problem was subsequently taken up by--and transformed through--the extended State. Both the way child care was created as a social problem and the way child care was taken up by the State limited working women's power to define their own needs and their capacity to minister to their own solutions. The net effect was that child care, originally established as a social problem in need of a political solution, was redefined a private matter in need of personal adjustment. Tragically, during a time in which the personal was not political, the relocation of the issue of child care to the private sphere authorized its virtual annihilation within public policy.

The post-war child care campaign reveals many contradictions associated with coalition-based social reform organizing. One difficulty was the problem of coalition-building itself. While an issue-oriented cross-class coalition of advocates was effective in generating a political response to imminent post war crisis, that coalition was soon undermined. Child study experts, social workers and the voluntary sector were gradually assimilated into the administration of child care. Their authority to speak on behalf of children and child care occurred at the expense of militant mothers in the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association. This would seem to pose strategic and tactical dilemmas for contemporary women's organizations coalition-building for struggle in and against the State, especially in the context of right-wing ideology.

The problems of State formation also emerge forcefully through this historical account. It is argued that issue redefinition is a nearly inevitable consequence of the way that the child care problem was created in 1946, and of the way it was processed within the broader public sector over the next half-dozen years. Seemingly neutral and non-partisan administrative practices like 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', and 'technical expertise' had distinctly political consequences. The organization of ruling across the extended State authorized reasonable and moderate advocates as credible intereners, and disenfranchised political militants. Yet advocates of all stripes were unable to problematize the systematic ways that State formation and administrative processes reorganized child care services, restricting their critiques to questions of detail. What emerges is that an inability to challenge administrative reorganizations was produced by the very structures through which advocates had to operate to make even minimal gains. In short, women's organizing became organized against them by the very processes with which they had engaged to make change.

Jan Barnsley has called this form of engagement "feminist action and institutional reaction" (Barnsley, 1989). If feminists are to be able to effectively contest 'institutional reaction,' we must be able to politicize State activity--to name, challenge and transform the way individuals are taken up by and participate in the relations of ruling. Unless activists can challenge the way the State and
the relations of ruling 'domesticate women's organizations--historically, and currently--we will fail to remedy the inadequacies of social welfare policy and practices. If this is so, then the current vogue for methodological individualists' "identity" politics may greatly weaken feminist organizing. Worse, perhaps, women may unwittingly continue to participate in relations of power and ruling which work against our feminist interests, dimly perceiving the contradictions but unable to forward transformative alternatives.
ENDNOTES


2. The work of Sue Findlay on representation has greatly influenced my thinking on these questions. See: Findlay, S. Making sense of privilege: Another look at the representation of 'women' in feminist practice. In L. Carty (Ed.), *And still we rise*. Toronto, ON: Women's Press.

3. Like Irving Abella, the words "leftwing", "militant", and "communist" are used more or less interchangeably. This usage is an accommodation to the methodological problem of naming the Parents' Association into a "communist" group on the basis of its Communist leadership. Abella, I. (1973). *Nationalism, communism and Canadian labour, 1935-1956*. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press.

4. Federal funds for child care were not forthcoming again for twenty years, until the 1966 *Canada Assistance Plan*, part of the Canadian version of the 'war on poverty', was introduced.


6. Many of the newspaper articles cited in this research belonged to Isabel Bevis, and were carefully preserved in a scrapbook. Unfortunately, no page numbers are listed. Other clippings come from the Board of Education Archives: likewise, they too do not identify page numbers. In some cases, clippings are not identified by date or publisher; in these cases, I have estimated the date and provide the title of the clipping. Researchers interested in full references can examine the full newspaper of the date cited.

7. DNA cost-sharing originally applied only to children under six years.


9. Figures refer to actual attendance in centres operated by the Department of Public Welfare. (Source: *Annual Reports* of the Department of Public Welfare, City of Toronto.) Number of days of care, while more accurate than enrollment figures, may be somewhat misleading. A report of 1,000 days/care--which sounds very dramatic--meant that roughly four children each received care five days/week for approximately 252 days/year.
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Letter to Commissioner Rupert. (1951b, June 18). File 86.2 vol.3 Community and Social Services, Metropolitan Toronto Archives.


Rupert. (1951, October 11). Department of Public Welfare, letter to Ald. Lipsett, Chair of Committee on Public Welfare from Commissioner Rupert, in response to written questions from the Day Nursery and Day Care Parents' Association.


Theorizing Political Difference in Toronto's Postwar Child Care Movement


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